The problem is that no-one has given a sensible suggestion for what "commitment to reason" might entail. I (rather absent-mindedly) attempted one: "holding that reason is the only source of knowledge". I’m quite prepared to concede that it’s not a good attempt. (How disastrous an attempt it is depends on what one means by "reason" – you chose the least charitable possible interpretation, but we needn’t pursue this.)

However whatever it may be, "commitment to reason" is in my view not compatible with beliefs arrived at via divine revelation. I do not accept that anyone who is "committed to reason" in any reasonable(!) sense, can hold Christian beliefs. I’m entirely happy therefore to conclude that Frege, Kant, Godel, and the rest were not committed to reason. This does not strike me as absurd, and nor does not imply that I think they were fuckwits.

You believe that Christian beliefs arrived at via divine revelation are compatible with commitment to reason. Why? i.e Why are they "epistemically permissible"? And why aren’t other divinely revealed beliefs? And please can I have (as a bench-mark) an example of a belief which is in your view not compatible with commitment to reason?

Thanks for the links, I’ll have a look at them in due course.

Does the same apply to rejecting Islamic revelation? I’m guess not…

I think you are mis-representing Larry: his original contention that, roughly

Only nutters would claim that they hold Religious views because of purely rational reasons.

The authorities you quote didn’t claim this: they held that their religious beliefs were, at least partly, because of "faith".

Larry, you are equivocating. Your original allegation was that “No-one who was ‘committed to reason’ could sensibly hold [Christian] beliefs.” In context, it was clear that you meant that holding Christian beliefs was irrational, and obviously so. When faced with the consequence that one of the two indisputably greatest geniuses in the entire history of logic had based his life around an obviously irrational set of beliefs, you began a Tour de France of backpedalling. To deny that Frege (and Kant) were “committed to reason,” you now say, was merely to assert that “they held that reason was not the only source of knowledge.” But since even the most demented rationalist would agree that reason is not the only source of knowledge, the charge against Frege doesn’t look quite so serious now, does it?

“I reckon that divine revelation (or something similar) can be used in defence of just about any belief . Therefore presumably one can believe just about anything and remain ‘committed to reason.’ This rather devalues the nature of the commitment.”

I did not say or imply that merely to invoke “divine revelation” was sufficient to guarantee that belief in the content of the purported revelation was consistent with a commitment to reason. That would certainly be absurd. I claimed that belief in the content specifically of Christian revelation was consistent with commitment to reason.

“What do you mean by ‘permissible’? People are permitted to believe whatever they like, it’s just that it might entail being wrong.”

I meant what I said: *epistemically* permissible; ie believable consistently with epistemic norms (norms governing the rational acquisition of belief).

On the epistemic costs of rejecting Christian revelation, see

http://www.faithquest.com/modules.php?name=Sections&op=viewarticle&artid=83

and

http://www.faithquest.com/modules.php?name=Sections&op=viewarticle&artid=84

"it just seems absurd to deny that Kant and Frege were ‘committed to reason’"

Why? It doesn’t involve denying that they were great thinkers, merely that they held that reason was not the only source of knowledge. In my opinion, if they believed in divine revelation then they were not committed to reason, whatever their other virtues. I’m not saying they were fuckwits.

Please could you give me an example of a belief (preferably one which is not demonstrably false) which you do think is inconsistent with "commitment to reason"? Because I reckon that divine revelation (or something similar) can be used in defence of just about any belief . Therefore presumably one can believe just about anything and remain "committed to reason". This rather devalues the nature of the commitment.

"The content of Christian revelation may strike you as highly implausible"

It does.

"but I do think that accepting it is epistemically perfectly permissible"

What do you mean by "permissable"? People are permitted to believe whatever they like, it’s just that it might entail being wrong.

"and there are rarely-acknowledged epistemic costs involved in rejecting it."

Namely?

Certainly Goedel was primarily a mathematical logician. I never meant to imply that he was an “unquestionable authority” in matters of philosophical logic; but his opinion should carry some weight. My sense is that mathematical logicians are more competent than philosophers of religion to pronounce on matters in philosophical logic, other things being equal.

Larry said, “Mainstream Western theism (at whatever level of culture) involves Christian beliefs, not just the existence of an abstract God as given by the ontological argument, but a personal God, whose only son was Jesus, who in turn was born on earth as a man, was killed, and who was resurrected, and a whole lot more to boot. No-one who was “committed to reason” could sensibly hold these beliefs.”

I strongly disagree. Larry implies that Kant, Cantor, Frege, Dummett, Geach, Smiley, van Fraassen, Plantinga, Anscombe, Donagan, van Inwagen and R M Adams are not committed to reason. (This is not an “argument from authority”; it just seems absurd to deny that Kant and Frege were ‘committed to reason,’ even if you disagree with my view that the other names on the list are first-rate philosophers.) Certainly Christians are committed to believing in divine revelation, and this is often contrasted with reason as a source of beliefs. But this contrast is misunderstood if it is taken to mean that belief in divine revelation is positively irrational. After all, the testimony of others in general can be contrasted with reason (in the sense of ‘working things out for yourself on the basis of your direct experience”) as a source of beliefs; but no-one thinks that it is irrational to acquire beliefs on the basis of testimony, and indeed our stock of beliefs would be immeasurably impoverished, and arguably our lives would be impossible, if we didn’t. The content of Christian revelation may strike you as highly implausible, but I do think that accepting it is epistemically perfectly permissible, and there are rarely-acknowledged epistemic costs involved in rejecting it. (I should add that I think that Clifford’s principle, that “it is wrong always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence,” is false, and is implicitly acknowledged to be false by anyone who believes that their partner is faithful.)

Which seems to imply that the incompleteness theorem comes out of nowhere: it doesn’t; it’s a logical consequence of formal systems which model certain axioms (or, as I meant it, "starting assumptions"). To me, you were suggesting that incompleteness theorem applies to anything (if not, then surely that are "starting assumptions" which limit the situations in which it can be applied).

I agree with your broader point, but you are now using "logic" to mean "philosphical logic", which I would consider to be rather distinct from "mathematical logic". Godel was a mathematical logician: hence I don’t see him as the unquestionable authority that you seem to on matters of wider, philosophical, logic.

Larry: thanks for clearing up what I presumably meant to type, rather than what I did!

I’ll get to the other objections later. Bloody studes are clamouring for my time.

This is true, but you mean "complete" rather than "decidable" (admittedly decidability does imply completeness).